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Adam  Smith  emphasised  on  many  occasions  the  fact  that  many  people,  when  looking  at 
marvellous or impressive phenomena, tend mistakenly to attribute their source to the intelligent 
design of some invisible hand. If the impressive phenomenon relates to the apparent order of social 
affairs −Smith seems to argue− again many people tend to believe that such state of affairs derives 
from  some  intelligent  plan
1.  In  a  similar  vein,  Hayek  (e.g.  1937)  insisted  diffusely  that  what 
economists call “equilibrium”, brought about by the intelligent design of rational beings, should be 
properly interpreted as a “social order”, brought about by the unintentional forces of evolution that 
shape the intentions of intelligent people. 
The aim of  this paper is not to pursue the connections between Smith, Hayek and evolutionism, 
an otherwise interesting topic (see e.g. Marciano, 2009, for interesting arguments related to this 
theme). Instead, it tries to offer a sort of general and abstract setup which can hopefully capture, at 
least partially, the sense of Smith’s and Hayek’s social order, and at the same time can account for 
endogenous social change. 
We start from the well-known observation that a basic characteristic of the economy, namely 
interaction among individuals, when tackled by means of the standard tools of game theory, leads to 
the  requirement  of  an  infinite  degree  of  rationality,  which  is  unfeasible  for  real  intelligent 
individuals. Indeed, when interacting individuals act purposively, they should consider strategic 
interaction, and this setting is modelled as a game. Apart from simple textbook cases, incomplete 
information is the normal condition, and this can lead to a high degree of indeterminacy of the 
possible outcomes, which is disliked by game theorists. Harsanyi (1967-68) proposed an ingenuous 
trick to bypass this problem, namely the common prior assumption: each player’s opinion about the 
surrounding  environment,  in  particular  about  other  players’  strategies,  is  constrained  to  be  the 
conditional  distribution  extracted  from  a  larger  common  prior,  conditional  on  which  of  a  set 
possible  types  that  player  actually  is;  and  all  this,  including  the  common  prior,  is  common 
knowledge. Under this assumption, one can resort to the usual Nash equilibrium concept to restrict 
the set of the possible outcomes of games of incomplete information played by rational players.   2 
Now,  that a  common  prior  exists  and  is commonly  known  is  already  a  questionable  tenet. 
Aumann (1987) argues informally that people grown in a common environment will converge to 
common opinions, even if they start from differentiated ones. However, in order not to fall into 
tautologies
2, this property should be proved, and the present paper will precisely argue that it is not 
necessarily true. But, even accepting for the sake of argument that a common prior exists, a more 
fundamental issue is raised by it. A prior is a distribution over some support, and a common prior 
requires a common support. Under incomplete information, each player understands that all other 
players  are  incompletely  informed  as  well,  and  are  thus  endowed  with  distributions  over  the 
surrounding environment, including other players’ characteristics. On the other side, a player’s 
characteristics include her/his distribution over the environment: hence we are lead to an infinite 
regress of distributions over distributions (infinite “belief hierarchies”). From this it follows that the 
dimension of the common support of a common prior must be infinite: this was formally proved by 
Mertens and Zamir (1985)
3, and confirmed by Aumann and Dreze (2008). 
Since  we  are  interested  in  real  interacting  people,  and  not  in  hyper-rational  beings,  this 
perspective is untenable. Paralleling the arguments of Keynes’ beauty contest
4, it is impossible that 
individuals proceed much further into this reasoning, and ore research is needed to capture some 
general properties  of social systems. It  is as if,  having  dared to taste the fruits of the Tree  of 
Knowledge of Evil and Good, we are now condemned to a hard job. Or, put differently, it is as if, 
having tried to build a Babel Tower, we must accept its collapse and the ensuing fact that people 
speak many languages: indeed, if our individuals cannot ground their interactions on a common 
prior, then they necessarily speak different languages. 
This does not mean that one must abandon any hypothesis of intelligence on the part of agents, 
nor that individuals do no  ‘understand’ each other. We simply drop  the assumption  of infinite 
rationality (if you like, call ‘bounded rationality’ the present alternative), considering individuals 
who tackle their choice problems in an interacting context being endowed with theories of a finite 
nature.  On  the  other  hand,  we  need  to  enquire  the  conditions  under  which  individuals,  while 
maintaining theories that are not constrained by  a common  prior,  are  lead to  believe  that they 
understand each other. This means that what they can observe is no surprise to them, at least during 
a finite time-span T, hence they keep maintaining those theories and acting accordingly. We term T-
equilibrium a situation like this. 
In order to develop out argument in an abstract way, and to capture some general properties of  
T-equilibria,  we  need  to  resort  to  some  simple  technical  machinery.  In  Section  2  we  describe 
informally how the setup can be construed. Section 3 presents a slightly more formal treatment, and 
offers a Main Proposition, stating the following: (a) the set of T-equilibria is a continuum whose   3 
dimension  increases  as  individuals  become  more  ‘sophisticated’,  i.e.  there  is  not  a  unique,  or 
‘natural’, ordered state of the system (indeterminacy); and (b) that dimension decreases as the time-
length of a T-equilibrium increases, i.e. the system is bound to exit eventually any ordered state it 






Consider a set of individuals who interact in a certain environment: i.e., they purposively make 
choices at subsequent dates in time, knowing that these choices affects each other’s welfare in some 
way. Actions chosen by individuals are not to be interpreted restrictively as simply market acts, 
such as supplies of and demands for goods: gestures, signals, words or phrases are actions as well. 
An  action  is  in  general  a  multidimensional  object at a  single  date:  besides  being  interested  in 
different objects at the same time, an individual might, e.g., offer a certain quantity and announce 
she/he will never produce that good again and look away knowing that the announcement is false. 
Individual  actions  unfold  in  time,  that  is,  individuals  formulate  intertemporal  action  plans. 
Consider a given time, and call it “the planning date”: at this date each individual is formulating a 
sequence  of  actions  for  subsequent  periods:  the  length  of  such  sequence  is  presumably  finite, 
though it might be longer or shorter depending on the individual being more or less farsighted. 
Given that a single-period action is multidimensional, the whole plan might well be a very high-
dimensional one. 
As regards the passing of time, we assume that there exists a common clock, a typical human 
artefact that everyone understands: the indexing of dates (no matter whether they are minutes or 
weeks) is thus recorded by the clock’s ticking. It is not necessary to assume that all individuals plan 
to perform a fully dimensional action (or any action at all) at each date: some people have a more 
frenetic way of life than others have, hence the former act more often than the latter do
5. Being the 
clock−time common to all individuals, if an agent plans not to implement (or does not plan to 
implement) a one- or a higher-dimensional act at any date, simply put a zero in the corresponding 
coordinate(s) of her/his action vector at that date. 
In order to formulate an action plan an individual must hold opinions and expectations about the 
working of the surrounding environment, that is about actions that will be undertaken by other   4 
individuals
6. We will call of an individual’s opinions her/his “individual theory” (or “individual 
model”) at the planning date. 
An individual theory plays a twofold role: one the one hand it produces expectations about the 
other individuals’ actions during the planning horizon, and on the other hand it prescribes actions to 
be  implemented  by  the  individual  during  the  same  planning  horizon.  Besides  depending  on 
expectations, planned actions must be thought of as being “optimal” with respect to some personal 
welfare criterion of the planning individual, and with respect to expectations. Here we do not want 
to go into any technical detail of the individual “maximisation” problem: we simply assume, for the 
sake of argument, that starting from their personal models all individuals are able to formulate 
expectations and to choose the ensuing preferred actions. 
What sort of objects are personal theories? One might want to think of them in terms of standard 
statistical models, as is common in most traditional economic theorizing. Of course this cannot be 
excluded for some individuals, for instance those trained in statistics or in post-graduate economics. 
It is however reasonable to think that individuals usually give their opinions a less explicit and 
structured form. This does not mean that it is impossible to offer a formal abstract representation of 
personal  theories:  a  promising  route  would  be  in  terms  of  neural  networks,  since  this  kind  of 
modelling appears to be more affine to some principles of the basic physiology of reasoning
7. What 
is  suggested  here  is  that  individuals  are  neural  networks,  and  not  that  they  not  use  them  as 
computing devices (as is fashionable today in, e.g., financial forecasting). 
In  both  cases,  i.e.  whether  one  considers  standard  statistical  models  or  neural  networks,  a 
personal theory has perforce a finite nature, as argued in the introductory remarks. In other terms, a 
personal theory can be represented by some model characterised by a finite number of parameters. 
Assume in addition that the model takes the form of a function mapping from parameter values to 
planned actions and expectations: that is, to each different parameter configuration there correspond 
different  intertemporal  actions  and  expectations.  From  the  present  point  of  view,  then,  an 
individual’s theory (or model) is equivalent to the configuration of its parameters. 
We say that agents (or agents’ theories) are more ‘sophisticated’ if they are characterised by a 
higher number of parameters, meaning of course that they consider a higher number of variables 
(own and others’ actions). Notice however that the number of parameters increases not only if an 
individual theory considers the others’ actions, but also if that individual tries to “rationalise” their 
possible actions as a result of their possible theories, leading to some “belief hierarchy”, to be 
considered finite anyway: see Remark 3 in the next Section. In addition, individuals can be deemed 
to be more sophisticated also if they plan their actions for longer time-spans.   5 
At the planning date (call it date “1”), an individual, endowed with a theory (i.e. a parameter 
constellation), plans her/his future actions and has expectations on the others’ actions
8. If, after 
observing the others’ actual actions of  the first date, she/he finds that her/his previous expectations 
are deluded, then she/he will be induced to modify her/his theory. This sets a learning story in. 
However, we do not want, and are presently unable, to study a learning process in analytical terms: 
hence, apart from some observations put forward in the concluding Section, we leave this problem 
aside. Suppose, on the contrary, that the individual’s expectations are fulfilled, given other agents’ 
choices: in this case her/his expectations on subsequent actions will remain unchanged, and the 
same will hold for planned actions. We reword this situation by saying that the individual’s theory 
is confirmed. 
Suppose now that our individual’s expectations are fulfilled for T subsequent dates: then her/his 
expectations and planned action remain equal to those formulated at the original planning date, and 
she/he keeps maintaining her/his theory for all this period. Finally, suppose that all individuals 
happen to be in such a situation starting from the initial date until date T: we call T-equilibrium this 
situation.  
A T-equilibrium is a state of affairs such that the actions undertaken by the individuals do not 
induce anyone to modify her/his theory, which in turn informs her/his actions, along the whole T-
long time span. This equilibrium notion is consistent with Hayek’s one
9. 
In a sense, one might say that along a T-equilibrium individual are allowed to believe that they 
are endowed with “rational expectations”, or that they live in a Nash equilibrium. However, this 
does not imply that they ‘know the true model of the economy’: in the present setup there is no true 
model of the economy. In fact, the Main Proposition proved in Section 3 states that the number 
(better, the dimension of the set) of T-equilibria increases with agents’ sophistication, i.e. with the 
number of parameters that characterise their theory, for given T: the more sophisticated agents are, 
the wider is the set of possible T-equilibria. Hence, in a world populated by sophisticated agents 
there are continuously many possible equilibria, and none of them is superior to the others in terms 
of ‘rationality’ of expectations. A trait that differentiates the present equilibrium notion from the 
conventional  rational-expectations  (or  Nash-equilibrium)  one  is  that  it  has  a  temporary  nature 
(indeed, the “T” symbol might stay for “temporary”). We do not see any problem in this, since we 
do not believe that real people have at their disposal an infinite amount of time to test whether they 
are Lucas-type (or Nash-type) people. 
On the other side, it follows from our Main Proposition that, for given agents’ sophistication, 
the  set  of  T-equilibria  shrinks  as  T  increases.  Since  the  dimension  of  this  set  decreases 
monotonically  with  T,  a  particular  time  T*  will  be  reached  in  which  it  becomes  null:  no  T-  6 
equilibrium can exist any longer after that date. Even if individual theories were so lucky as to 
support  a  T*-equilibrium,  the  system  will  exit  that  equilibrium  at  date  T*+1,  that  is  agents’ 
expectations will start being deluded. At that point, people will necessarily need to change their 
minds, i.e. try to learn something different. Social change, then, is endogenously implied by our 





Consider k interacting individuals. An action performed by individual i at a single date is a 
multidimensional array, i.e. a vector that is taken to belong to some subset of the  i n -dimensional 
Euclidean space
10 for simplicity. Assuming that the dimension of the single-date action set is equal 
at all dates, it follows that i’s intertemporal plan is formally a vector whose dimension is  i iT n :  i T  is 
the time horizon of i’s plan, which is finite by assumption. 
A personal theory extended for a  i T -long time span can be represented by some model 
i T i G ,  
characterised by a finite number of parameters, that is real numbers. Let  i m  be the number of 
parameters of i’s personal theory. Individual i’s personal theory is uniquely defined by its parameter 
vector:  each  different  parameter  configuration  implies  a  different  theory.  Call  i M   the  set  of 
possible  theories  (that  is,  parameter  configurations)  of  individual  i  at  the  planning  date,  with 
i m
i M R ⊆ : a single parameter configuration for agent i will be denoted by  i i M ∈ µ . 
The  model 
i T i G ,   can  be  construed  as  mapping  from  i M   to  expectations  and  planned  own 
optimal  actions  over  a  i T -long  time  span.  This  requires,  of  course,  that  many  underlying 
assumptions be satisfied in order that a possibly very complex optimal control problem is solved by 
the individual
11. We assume that those assumptions hold; we assume in addition that 
i T i G ,  is a 
function, i.e. it is one to one, and that it is (at least piece-wise) smooth.  
Now, split 
i T i G ,  into the expectation and the action components: call 
E
T i i G ,  the component of 
i T i G ,   that  outputs i’s expectations, and call 
A
T i i G ,   the component of  i G  that  prescribes  i’s own 
optimal actions (to be sure, also own actions are expressed in expected value terms: see Remark 2 
below).    Hence, 
A
T i i G ,   maps  from  a  i m −dimensional  space  to  i’s  individual  actions,  whose 
dimension  is  i iT n ;  and 
E
T i i G ,   maps  from  a  i m −dimensional  space  to  i’s  expectations  about  all   7 
individual actions over a time horizon of length  i T . Finally, setting  ￿ =
j
j n n , define  ( ) i i i nT T p = : 
this is the total number of variables about which individual i might entertain expectations, i.e. the 
number of joint intertemporal actions on the part of all individuals, extended to i’s personal time 










T i M G R → : , . 
Some cautionary Remarks are in order. 
Remark 1. We have assumed that each individual maintains expectations about each intertemporal 
action of any other individual: in fact the space of i’s expectations coincides with the joint space of 
all  individuals’  actions.  This  entails  assuming  that  j n   is  known  to  all  i’s.  However,  is  it  not 
necessary that an individual considers the whole space of each other individual’s actions. Indeed the 
individual, while forming expectations, might omit some variables, or might even be unaware of 
their existence. In this case, one could simply put a ‘blank’ in the corresponding element of her/his 
expectation  vector:  then  this  vector  stays  of  the  same  formal  dimension  as  before,  namely 
( ) i i i nT T p = . Alternatively, one might consider explicitly the case ( ) i i i nT T p < : our result, however, 
would not be modified significantly, as we shall see. In any case, we will disregard the case in 
which an individual forms expectations about actions not included in the actual action spaces of the 
other individuals. 
Remark 2. Observe that i’s expectations are extended to include own actions: in fact the sum in the 
expression  ( ) ￿ =
j
i j i i T n T p  runs over all individuals, including i her/himself. This means simply 
that,  since  own  planned  actions  depend  upon  expectations  about  the  others’  actions,  they  are 
themselves expected and not certain, given own theory at the planning date. Expected own actions 
are simply the “best responses” to expected actions on the part of other individuals. It follows that 
A
T i i G , , the action part of i’s model as defined above, describes expectations of own actions, not 
simply own actions, from date 2 onward (of course, first-date actions are planned in a deterministic 
way). 
Remark 3.  We must now reason on the number  i m  of parameters defining i’s theory. Roughly 
speaking, one would argue that for each variable on which expectations are formed there is at least 
one parameter in the model. Hence, i’s model should include at least  i i nT m =  parameters: but such 
number would be greater than this, if the model incorporated affine or non-linear forms
12: it could 
be e.g.  i i i nT a m = , where  1 > i a  is the average number of parameters for each expected variable in 
i’s model. Hence we have  i i nT m > . In the Introduction we argued however that individuals, while 
not being infinitely rational, might try to “outsmart” their fellows: that is, they might elaborate on   8 
the other individuals’ theories, in order to better rationalise their actions
13. This means that other 
people’s theories become objects of own theories, giving rise to finite “hierarchies of beliefs”. Now, 
we know that individual models coincide with their parameter configurations: therefore if individual 
i wishes to account for other people’s models, the number of the parameters in i's model itself must 
increase accordingly. This effect will be the greater, the more is i’s theory “sophisticated”, i.e. the 
higher is degree of her/his belief hierarchy. If for instance i thinks that the others are “basically” as 
intelligent  as  i  her/himself,  then  the  deduction  is  that  every  other’s  model  should  have  i inT a  
parameters. To account for all these parameters about which i is uncertain, i’s model should include 
at  least  ( ) i inT a k 1 −   parameters,  where  k  is  the  number  of  interacting  individuals:  this  is  the 
implication of having a formal theory over the others’ theories. If i is even more sophisticated, 
believing that all other individuals have theories over theories, and wishes to account for this, then 
i’s model should contain at least  ( ) i inT a k
2 1 −  parameters; and if you go h steps ahead into this 
logical process, you will get  ( ) i i
h nT a k 1 −  parameters. Our discussion shows that the number of 
parameters of each individual theory,  i m , can be as large as   ( ) > − i i
h nT a k 1   ( ) i
hnT k 1 − , where 
0 ≥ h  depends on how much sophisticated an individual is
14. 
Now, we come to T-equilibrium. Define first  i
i
T T min = , that is the time-horizon of the less 
farsighted  individual.  Assume  that  each  individual  forms  expectations  about  the  actual  actions 
spaces  of  all  individuals,  i.e.  her/his  expectation  function  contains  no  ‘blanks’  (see  Remark  1 
above). The implication of this is that  ( ) nT T pi =  is common to all individuals, hence we can write 
( ) T p  to denote this common dimension of the expectation space of any individual. Call  ( ) i
E
T i G µ ,  
the ‘projection’ of the image of  ( ) i
E
T i i G µ ,  on its first T time-coordinates. Define further  ( ) i
A
T i G µ ,  as 
the projection of i’s action function on its first T time-coordinates: the image of this function has 
dimension  T ni .  Setting  ( ) k µ µ µ µ , , , 2 1 ￿ = ,  define  finally  the  joint  action  function  of  all 








T G G G G µ µ µ µ , 2 , 2 1 , 1 , , , ￿ = .  One  has  thus  T
A
T A M G → : ,  where 
∏ =
i
i M M  and  ∏ =
i
T i T A A , . The dimension of M is  ￿ =
i
i m m  and that of  T A  is  ( ) nT T p = . 
It is reasonable to think that if expectations are deluded, then an individual will change her/his 
mind, i.e. expectations and plan. This would lead to some form of learning, on which we cannot 
elaborate here in an analytical way. If, on the contrary, expectations are fulfilled up to a certain date 
t, then we can say that the individual does not change her/his expectations and plan for subsequent 
dates. Indeed, calling  ( ) x Ei  the prior expected value of x and  ( ) y x Ei  the posterior expected value   9 
after observing a realization y, one has  ( ) ( ) ( ) x E x E x E i i i =  under any reasonable learning process. 
Since  we  are  assuming  that  individuals  are  so  bright  as  to  plan  initially  their  future  actions 
conditional on any event they might happen to face, it follows that expected values of subsequent 
events are computed recursively, based on expected values of previous events: if the latter remain 
unchanged after observing actual actions up to a certain date t, the former, concerning the dates 
from t+1 onward, remain unchanged as well. In particular, the own action actually undertaken at 
date t+1 stays equal to what the individual expected beforehand. Thus: if actual actions undertaken 
by all other individuals at all dates from 1 to T are equal to what individual i expected initially, 
namely they are equal to  ( ) i
E
T i G µ , , then actual actions undertaken by i are equal to what she/he 
expected initially, namely  ( ) i
A
T i G µ , . This situation might be called an individual equilibrium of 
length T.  
We are led to define a general T-equilibrium, or simply a T-equilibrium, as a state of affairs in 
which all individuals find themselves in a individual equilibrium of length T. From the argument of 
the last paragraph it follows that along a T-equilibrium actual actions on the part of all individuals 
are equal to  ( ) µ
A
T G , as defined above. In order that a T-equilibrium holds, it necessary that each 
individual’s expectations on all agents’ choices are equal to their actual realisations. Hence one can 
put forward the following 
 




T i G G = , ,  i ∀ . 
   
However, we saw in Remark 2 above that i’s expectations are extended  to include own actions. 
Now, under an optimal plan, expectations on own actions coincide with own planned actions (taken, 
of course, in expected value terms). In other terms, we can say that the projection of  ( ) i
E
T i G µ ,  on i’s 
own actions is equal to  ( ) i
A
T i G µ , . A short reflection will then show that we can give the following 
alternative definition of a T-equilibrium: 
 




T i G G µ µ , , = ,  j i, ∀ . 
 
Whether  the  system  is  in  T-equilibrium  or  not  depends  clearly  on  the  configuration  of  all 
individual theories, i.e. on the configuration of all individual parameters described by the vector µ. 
In addition, in our setting all relevant expectations and actions depend on those parameters. For this   10 
reason we attach the T-equilibrium property to µ vectors, and say that a vector  M ∈ µ  is a T-
equilibrium if the condition of Definition 1b is satisfied. Now we enquire whether T-equilibria can 
exist, and ‘how many’ they are in the parameter space M. As regards this, we can offer following 
 
Main Proposition. The set of  T-equilibria has generically topological dimension  ( )nT k m 1 − −  in 
the parameter space M. 
Proof: see the Appendix. 
 
Only  if  the  dimension  quoted  in  the  Proposition  is  non-negative
15  T-equilibria  exist 
generically
16. In particular, if this dimension is equal to zero, equilibria are generically finite in 
number, while if it is positive the set of equilibria forms generically a continuum. 
One  may  ask  how  likely  the  continuum  case  is.  Recall  the  following:  k  is  the  number  of 
interacting  individuals;  ￿ =
i
i m m   is  the  number  of  parameters  of all  individual  theories  taken 
together;  ￿ =
j
j n n  is total number of (scalar) actions undertaken by all individuals at each date; 
and  T  is  a  common  time-horizon  to  which  individual  plans  and  expectations  are  extended, 
corresponding to the time-horizon of the less far-sighted individual. Thus, nT  is the total number of 
intertemporal actions on which individuals form expectations by means of their theories, restricted 
to the time-horizon of the most myopic of them. On the other side, recall what we observed in 
Remark 3 above, and in the ensuing definitions: from those arguments it follows that for each 
individual one has  nT mi > ; better,  i m can well be much higher that  nT , considering that she/he 
might want to speculate on other people’s theories (up to a finite degree), and given that a joint 
distribution on a certain number of variables requires an even higher number of parameters (see 







 can well be much higher than  ( )nT k knT 1 − > , leading to 
( ) 0 1 > − − nT k m . As a consequence, the case of a continuum of equilibria is fairly probable. If our 
individuals become more sophisticated, i.e. if m increases, the dimension of the T-equilibrium set 
grows, for given T. Finally, the case of an individual ‘not caring’ of some action undertaken by 
some  other  individual  (see  Remark  1  above)  imposes  fewer  constraints  on  the  equilibrium 
condition, and hence raises further the dimension of the equilibrium set. 
Notice:  given  our  assumption  of  smoothness  of  the  functions  ( ) i
A
T i G µ ,   mapping  from 
parameters  to  actions,  one  expects  that  to  different  equilibrium  parameters  there  correspond 
different equilibrium action plans. Hence, one cannot hope to ‘refine’ the set of equilibria in terms   11 
of observational equivalence. In other words, we do not expect that the set of equilibrium actions is 
‘thin’, independently of how large the set of equilibrium parameters is. In addition, at the present 
level of generality it is not feasible to refine the equilibrium set using Pareto-ranking arguments. 
Another important implication of the Main Proposition is the following one: given the single-
date joint action space (i.e., given n) and given the ‘sophistication’ of individual theories (i.e., given 
m), an increase in the time-horizon T reduces the dimension of the T-equilibrium set, since it lowers 
the number  ( )nT k m 1 − −  until it becomes null or negative. For high T’s, a set of theories of given 
sophistication cannot support generically any T-equilibrium. 
 
 
4. Interpretation and implications 
 
In this Section we offer some brief comments, grouped under ten headings, whose aim is to 
work out some interpretation of the above analysis, and to show how it might direct future research. 
 
Intelligence  and  social  order.  Our  intelligent  agents  try  somehow  to  outsmart  each  other 
elaborating on each other’s opinions, in order to better forecast their fellows’ future actions and 
hopefully obtain higher returns. They are lead to do this, precisely because they are conscious of 
interaction.  However,  it  is  impossible  that  everyone  outsmarts  everyone  else,  since  this  would 
require an infinite amount of silicon chips, or of grey matter. Along a T-equilibrium −or, in Hayek’s 
terms, a social order− what makes agents satisfied with their theories is that they do no happen to 
observe anything that comes as a confutation. “Full rationality”, as understood by some, would 
require infinitely more than this; “intelligence” requires instead a finite amount of thinking. We 
would take it as an axiom −it comes also from our daily experience− that intelligent people have a 
preference  for  ‘psychological  tranquillity’:  if a  theory  ‘works’,  meaning  that  nobody  sends  me 
signals contradicting it, one prefers to stick to it, and not spend resources inventing a new one. After 
all, we know of very long-lasting social orders in which many intelligent people believed that the 
Sun  goes  around  the  Earth.  Closer  to  our  matters,  we  know  of  social  orders  in  which  many 
intelligent people believe that economic policies are (are not) effective, and they see that they are 
(are not) so. 
Indeterminacy and relativity. The existence of a continuum of possible social orders is called 
indeterminacy by economists. In our setting, its meaning is that there are (infinitely) many different 
possible  ways  in  which  interacting  people  might  conceive  correctly  their  interaction,  and  act 
accordingly. In other terms, there is not a single model (the ‘true model’, as Rational-Expectation   12 
scholars would call it) of the economy. To each different constellation of individual models, if they 
form a social order, there corresponds a different evolution of the economy that confirms those 
models  (see also  the  quotation from  Hayek  in footnote  9  above).  This  relativity  might  disturb 
someone pretending to ‘refine’ the set of equilibria to reach uniqueness. However, this is a problem 
of our economist, not of the agents populating a certain social order: the latter are living in a single 
social order, and are not so lucky as to experience something which might suggest to them the 
existence of other orders. In addition, given the preference for ‘psychological tranquillity’, they are 
hardly motivated to ‘tremble’ around the equilibrium they are living in. It seems odd that a theorist 
pretends that the agents living in her/his model be endowed with the same theory that she/he is 
endowed with. Put in a different, and perhaps interesting, way: the economist her/himself should be 
viewed as an agent, maintaining a certain individual theory and interacting with other people in the 
economy. 
Indeterminacy and nature.  Basically, our  indeterminacy derives from the high  number  of 
degrees of freedom that characterises agents’ theories, compared with the set of events that they 
might  observe,  namely  their  own  actions.  There  is  an  argument  put  forward  by  Rational-
Expectations  theorists  to  the  effect  that  agents  should  use  parsimonious  models:  hence,  ‘over-
parametrised’  models  are  not  welcome  by  those  theorists.  On  the  one  side,  the  argument  is 
motivated  by  the  econometrics  practice,  as  if  it  were  pretended  that  all  agents  be  themselves 
econometricians, which is not necessarily the case; on the other side, it purports to urge that agents 
use the same model the theorist uses, which again is questionable as we argued before. In addition, 
if it were the case that we know the true model of the world, and handled it in a fully rational way, it 
would be impossible to explain why theories (and scientific theories) change in time and evolve: if 
that were the case, we should be in a position to know all the theorems of algebra instantly without 
any ‘sweat of our brow’, and without any need to learn new things.  But, more importantly, that 
argument seems to be contradicted by the mere observation of our brain and of its functioning: its 
capabilities, even if never exploited hundred percent, are fantastic in terms of degrees of freedom 
(see footnotes 7 and 14 above). A related example comes from biology: if organisms were projected 
in the same way as engineers project their tools (i.e. without any degree of freedom), and were not 
the result of DNA replication −a good instance of high redundancy− we would know no evolution. 
Social order and language. Along the unfolding of any one social order the actions performed 
by individuals, and circulating among them, can be interpreted as signals, hence as a (more or less 
sophisticated) language: an ‘ordered’ dialogue is one where the words emitted are understandable, 
i.e. are  no surprise, for the receiving part. So, different social orders imply different languages: if a 
population is split into different parts by the collapse of a giant Babel Tower, and these parts are   13 
confined in different lands, they would end up speaking different languages even if they faced very 
similar experiences. True: if contacts among them restart, some form of translation can be devised, 
which is however imperfect; but most probably a new language will be born (more on this point 
below, under the headings ‘learning’, ‘nurture’ and ‘change’). Given the argument put forward 
above on the high number of degrees of freedom, one expects that a language is ‘less complex’ that 
any underlying individual theory: it is the tip of the iceberg, and the ‘intimate’ meaning of words 
might well differ significantly among different individuals. However, along a social order nothing 
happens that unveils these differences. 
Indeterminacy and learning. Since a society of interacting intelligent individuals can end up 
in one of infinitely many possible social orders, which one of them will be picked up depends 
necessarily on learning. If their expectations are deluded, individuals will modify their theories, and 
this sets up a dynamical system: the stability properties of this system are obviously very hard to be 
worked out analytically, but we can easily state a couple of general properties thereof. First, given 
multiplicity, the final state of the learning process depends on initial conditions, and if some noise is 
present on actual history as well: as a consequence, what is learnt in an interactive setting is not 
something objectively ‘true’, differently from what happens when we say we have learnt the length 
of the Earth day. Second, as non-linearity is surely a significant feature of the dynamical system, 
small differences in initial conditions can lead to large differences in final states (the space covered 
by the ruins of the Tower is very small with respect to the Earth surface, but languages are differ a 
lot from each other). 
Indeterminacy and nurture. Not only learning, but also teaching is a fundamental activity 
within social systems. Individuals do not enter their interactions starting from nothing except a 
given set of free parameters: they come from many past experiences during which older members 
tried to educate them in different fields. This raises the interesting question addressed to traditional 
economic  theorists:  at  which  age  do  rational  individuals  start  being  rational?  Apart  from  our 
preference  for  ‘intelligent’  instead  of  ‘rational’,  a  reasonable  answer  could  be  ‘short  after 
conception’. Not only: a longer-term genetic learning takes place in the population, shaping the 
biological bases of individual theories. Hence, many constraints contribute to actually ‘refine’ the 
set of possible social orders. This notwithstanding, any new problem faced in an interactive setting 
raises the questions we have been discussing in this paper. Even supervised training is no guarantee 
that the pupil learnt ‘exactly’ what the teacher taught: if this were always the case, we could be back 
to  the  ‘no  sweat’  ex-ante  knowledge  of  all  theorems,  and  we  could  not  explain  cultural  and 
scientific evolution and differences.    14 
Endogenous social change. We saw in Section 3 that, given the dimensions of the joint theory 
and action spaces, the set of T-equilibria shrinks as the time T increases, until when no social order 
can exist generically. Thus, a social system where all individual theories support a social order is 
bound to exit that order sooner or later. Some of the individuals, and more of them as time elapses, 
will start observing unexpected facts, i.e. facts that delude the expectations formed on the basis of 
those theories. This will require a change of mind and a new learning process, whose outcome is 
fairly indeterminate ex ante, for the very same reasons discussed until now. This is why we contend 
that the notion of T-equilibrium can explain, not only social order, but also social change as an 
endogenous phenomenon. On the one hand, sophistication implies indeterminacy, resolved only by 
learning and history; on the other hand, finiteness implies that no mind can forecast everything in 
the indefinite future, and that every theory is in essence provisional. To be sure, there can exist very 
simple-minded social orders in which things repeat equal to themselves day by day, and this can last 
for centuries. But nothing in our arguments prevents that planned actions follow very complicated 
paths
17, and the more so if individuals are more sophisticated. Hence, there will be someone who 
will stop understanding them sooner or later. 
Learning, precision and catastrophes. It is a property of almost all known learning processes 
that what Bayesian statisticians call ‘subjective precision’, that is the confidence individuals attach 
to their  own  theories, increases as they accumulate more  observations. It corresponds also  our 
normal experience. This entails that individuals find it more and more difficult to change their 
minds as time elapses. If, then, the system exits eventually a given social order, people will start 
observing ‘strange’ things: they will be tempted to consider those things as ‘outliers’, and give them 
no  importance,  coherently  with  their  high  precisions.  But  if  outliers  keep  accumulating,  this 
situation will start being intolerable. Traditional statistical practice offers no tool to handle this 
problem, but one can argue that on these occasions sudden jumps, or ‘catastrophes’, take place in 
individual minds and in the whole system. If one were to model theories and learning by means of 
neural networks, this would precisely be the case also in technical terms, given the typical non-
linearity incorporated in these objects (see footnote 7 above). The width of these jumps is higher, 
the deeper our theories are rooted in our minds, i.e. the higher their precisions are, and the more the 
observations are at variance with theories. 
Innovation. The exit from a previous social order is a source of uncertainty both for individuals 
and for the whole system. Given our ‘axiom of psychological tranquillity’, one expects that people 
are gratified if they can resolve that uncertainty in a short time
18. Suppose that one individual 
succeeds in announcing a new explanation of how things are going, and in convincing a critical 
mass of other people of its soundness: there is an innovator. Three seem to be the conditions for this   15 
success: brightness, or sophistication on our sense, in that one needs to anticipate the reactions of 
the other individuals to the new theory; luck, in that one cannot know the others’ minds in detail and 
anticipate their reactions; and, above all, power, in that the new theory must arrive loud and clear to 
the recipients in order to overcome their current uncertainty. 
Strong ties and open societies. As we said under the heading ‘endogenous social change’, there 
exist ‘simple-minded’ social orders in which things repeat themselves almost equal day after day. 
This case is typical, mainly, of small communities that are relatively closed with respect to the 
outside world. In these communities the ‘ties’ tend to be strong (Granovetter, 1973 and 1983; cp. 
also Burt, 1995), not only because everyone is linked to everyone else in the group and to none of 
the outside world, but mainly because the repetition of commonly understood experiences tends to 
reinforce  everybody’s  confidence  in  her/his  personal  theory,  seemingly  shared  by  everyone 
(culture?). These communities are particularly fragile to powerful enough external shocks, like the 
opening  of  new  links  with  other  communities  entertaining  different  views  and  speaking 
unintelligible  languages.  Observe,  however,  that  the  same  can  be  true  of  larger  communities 
governed  by  simple  and  strong  ideas  embedded  in  people’s  minds  by  means  of  an  artful 
propaganda. In both cases, the contamination with hitherto unknown ‘viruses’ can lead to very keen 
breakdowns in the previous prevailing social order (including wars), which are painful for society. 
On the contrary, ‘weak ties’ imply that people are prepared to weigh new ideas and theories. For 
this  reason,  some  recommend  that  societies  are  always  ‘open’  to  external  stimuli,  in  order  to 
minimise their potentially disruptive effects on an exceedingly hard-shell social system. One should 
also compare this view with the fundamental tenets of classical Liberals: free entry, social mobility 
and equal opportunities.   16 
1 Most noticeable is Smith’s treatment of this point in Section III of The History of Astronomy 
(Smith, 1795, already written by 1773); the same point, as is well known, is resumed scantily in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Part IV chap. 1, and in the Wealth of Nations (1776), Book IV 
chap. 2. See also Macfie (1971) and Rassekh (2009); the latter argues in a vein similar to that put 
forward in the present paper. 
2  Aumann  (1976)  showed  that  interacting  people,  sending  some  signal  to  each  other,  cannot 
eventually  agree  to  disagree:  they  will  arrive  to  common  opinions  in  finite  time.  However,  in 
Aumann’s argument the complete description of the possible states is known to all them initially, 
together with a map from what they can observe and the possible refinements of their posteriors. In 
other terms, the common prior is already there at the outset. 
3  More  precisely,  these  authors  proved  that  the  dimension  of  the  support  must  be  higher  than 
infinite, since it must be equal to the transfinite numberω , i.e. the lowest number which is greater 
than any natural number. 
4 One should notice that a similar argument was put forward by Hayek as well (1952, pp.185-ff.), 
when he observed that a single mind cannot understand any other individual mind in detail, since 
this would lead to an infinite regress. 
5 This way of putting things might be interpreted as agreeing with an oft-maintained subjectivity of 
the perception of the flow of time on the part of different individuals. 
6 One could conceive opinions and expectations as being defined about other variables as well. 
These “system” variables might be entirely exogenous, which are fairly uninteresting from our point 
of view; or they might depend in turn on individual actions: think e.g. of “GDP”, or of prices 
formed as results of market demands and supplies (some prices should however be included among 
individual actions, if a subset of individuals are price-makers). This extension would not alter our 
setting  significantly:  one  should  (a)  define  the  “structural”  function  mapping  from  individual 
actions to system variables, and (b) extend individual expectation formation to an enlarged space 
including the same system variables. However for simplicity we prefer to concentrate on action-
variables only. 
7 In this paper it is not possible to go into the details of neural network modelling, and we refer e.g. 
to Serra-Zanarini (1990), Hertz et al. (1991), Haykin (1994), Golden (1996), for introductions. We 
only recall the following properties of  neural networks:  (a) a  network is composed of  a finite 
number of units (“neurons”) receiving signals from (and sending signals to) the other units; (b) the 
signals being sent between units depend on the value taken on by the sending units, and on the 
strength of the synaptic links between them; (c) a subset of the units are connected with sensor units   17 
recording external stimuli, or with actuator units performing external “actions”; (d) to any external 
stimulus,  which  is  a  multidimensional  array  hitting  many  sensory  units  simultaneously,  the 
corresponds a “final state” of the whole networks, a value for each unit, which is possibly translated 
into some action (again a multidimensional array); (e) stimuli giving rise to the same final state (or 
action) have the same “meaning”; (f) a final state induced by a stimulus is not necessarily constant: 
it can be an oscillation, if the network is a so called “recurrent network” (as opposed to a “feed-
forward” one), that is if there are feedbacks in the net; (g) the working of a network, i.e. how stimuli 
are translated into final states and actions, is governed by a finite set of parameters, representing the 
strengths of the synaptic links between any pair of units; (h) although units can take on continuous 
values,  under  certain  parameter  values  final  states  can  be  seen,  for  all  practical  purposes,  as 
discrete, since units behave mainly as binary variables; (i) the configuration of parameter values at a 
certain date depends on the past history, that is on learning on the part of the network: learning 
takes the form of changes in parameter values; (j) given that neural networks incorporate significant 
non-linearities, a small change in parameter values can induce important changes in the working of 
the net, that is in the way different stimuli are given different meanings; (k) finally, and somehow 
interestingly  for  Austrian  economics,  we  are  convinced  that  neural  networks  are  a  good 
representation of some of Hayek’s (1952) ideas on “sensory order”. 
8  To  be  precise,  she/he  plans  own  action  of  date  1,  and  has  expectations  on  own  actions  of 
subsequent dates, since these depend on her/his expectations on others’ actions. 
9 Consider the following famous quotation from Hayek (1937), p. 42: “Correct foresight is then not, 
as it has sometimes been understood, a precondition which must exist in order that equilibrium may 
be arrived at. It is rather the defining character of a state of equilibrium. Nor need foresight for this 
purpose be perfect in the sense that it need extend into the indefinite future or that everybody must 
foresee  everything  correctly.  We  should  rather  say  that  equilibrium  will  last  so  long  as  the 
anticipations prove correct and that they need to be correct only on those points which are relevant 
for the decisions of individuals”. See also Hahn’s (1973) notion of conjectural equilibrium. 
10 This means that action are seen as continuous, not discrete objects. This might appear a strong 
assumption; for instance, words seem to be discrete in nature. See however footnote 10 above, 
related to neural networks, property (h), for a justification of this assumption. On careful reflection 
it will be understood that an individual rarely pronounces a given word in exactly the same way, 
depending on the detailed configuration of her/his neural network at each instant. Hence, ‘actions’ 
may well be deemed to be continuous variables.   18 
11  These  assumptions  include  continuity  of    the  personal  welfare  function,  compactness  of  its 
domain, proper convexities, discount rate lower than one. We leave, however, the detailed study of 
the analytical solution to this problem to better equipped minds, if they are so interested. 
12 Consider in addition that, apart from the ‘structural’ form of the model, in purely statistical terms 
a distribution on n variables requires m>n parameters. For instance, if one posits a uniform joint 
distribution on n independent variables, one needs 2n parameters, two endpoints for each dimension 
of the support; if one posits a joint normal distribution on n variables, one needs n + n(n+1)/2 
parameters, the former addend for the means, and the latter for the symmetric covariance matrix. 
13 Indeed, when we try to understand other people’s behaviour we are usually not interested in their 
actions point-wise, but we aim at finding relations between these actions, in order to be able to 
better anticipate their evolution. This is a clear symptom that we are trying to understand somehow 
the theories which underpin their actions. 
14 Think of individual theories as stemming from natural neural networks, like human brains: in 
order to appreciate how large the number of parameters can be, refer to note 7 above and consider 
that  the  number  of  units  in  such  networks  is  of  the  order  of 
11 10 ,  while  the  number  of  their 
connections, i.e. of their parameters, is estimated to be of the order of (at least) 
14 10 . 
15 Following the arguments of the Appendix, one understand the meaning of a ‘negative’ dimension 
from the following example. Consider the 3D space, and consider two 1D lines embedded in it. 
From the Theorem used in the Appendix, the so called ‘co-dimension’ of their intersection is 4, 
since it is the sum of the two co-dimensions of the lines, each of which is the complement of its 
dimension  in  the  reference  3D  space,  and  hence  is  2.  It  follows  that  the  dimension  of  the 
intersection is 3−(2+2) = −1, meaning that two lines do not intersect generically in the 3D space, an 
obvious fact. 
16 A generic property is one that, if satisfied, keeps holding true in a whole full-measure subset of 
the reference space (here, the parameter space). Hence, what the Proposition proves is not that T-
equilibria  exist  always,  but  that  it  is  generically  the  case  that  they  do  exist,  i.e.  one  can  find 
parameter values such that they exist, if the reported dimension is non-negative. 
17 See Boldrin-Montrucchio (1986) for an example of chaotic paths followed by optimal plans, even 
in purely individual, non interactive, problems. 
18 There is a whole spectrum of the strength of this urgency, depending on the role one happens to 
play: the two extremes are possibly the sport or political supporter and the patient scientist.   19 
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Appendix 
Proof of the Main Proposition 
 
Firstly, the individual expectation function extended over the T time-horizon is  T i
E
T i A M G → : , . 








T G G G G µ µ µ µ , 2 , 2 1 , 1 , , , ￿ =  can be seen as mapping 
from the space  ∏ =
i
i M M , whose dimension is m, to the space ( )
k
T A , the k-th Cartesian power of 
T A , whose dimension is knT . Call  1 X  the graph of this function: given our assumptions,  1 X  is (at 
least piece-wise) a smooth manifold. The topological dimension of  1 X  is m, and it is embedded in 
the space X = M X ( )
k
T A , whose dimension is  knT m + . 




T i G G µ µ , , = ,  j i, ∀ . 
It requires that the images of all individual expectation functions intersect in the “diagonal” ∆ of the 
Cartesian power  ( )
k
T A , whose dimension is  nT . Define the product space  = 2 X  M X ∆:  2 X  is 
clearly  a  smooth  manifold  embedded  in  the  space  X,  and  its  dimension  id  nT m+ .  The  T-
equilibrium condition is thus satisfied at the intersection  ￿ 2 1 X X , which is a subset of  1 X . 
We want to evaluate the dimension of the subset of M such that  1 X  intersects  2 X . Said differently, 
we want to evaluate the dimension of the projection of  ￿ 2 1 X X  on M. Since the projection of  1 X  
on M is of ‘full’ dimension in M, it follows that the dimension of the projection of  ￿ 2 1 X X  on M 
is the same as the topological dimension of  ￿ 2 1 X X . 
Define  the  co-dimension  of  a  set  Y  in  the  embedding  space  Z  as  ( ) ( ) ( ) Y Z Y dim dim codim − = . 
Consider now the following Theorem (see e.g. Guillemin-Pollack 1974, p. 30): 
 
The intersection of two manifolds  1 X  and  2 X  in the space X is a manifold, and the following holds: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 codim codim codim X X X X + = ￿ . 
 
We  have  ( ) knT m knT m X = − + = 1 codim   and  ( ) ( )nT k nT m knT m X 1 codim 2 − = − − + = .  It 
follows  ( ) ( )nT k knT X X 1 codim 2 1 − + = ￿ , and thus  ( ) ( )nT k m X X 1 dim 2 1 − − = ￿ .         Q.E.D. 
 